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1 Introduction
The effectiveness of training programs for the unemployed has been a long-debated issue
(Heckman et al., 1999; Andersson et al., 2013; Heinrich et al., 2013) and there is renewed
interest in active labor market policies in the aftermath of the great recession (Martin,
2015). Proponents of training programs argue that they are a good investment, since
enhancing the abilities and skills of unemployed individuals would lead to a quicker rein-
tegration into the labor market, thus resulting in a win-win situation for the unemployed,
the government, and the employers. Critics claim that the resources spent on training
programs are mostly wasted, however. They argue that the programs themselves do not
have any positive impact on later employment, as they keep the unemployed away from
the labor market (the so-called lock-in effect). In this view, any observed positive outcome
may only reflect a positive selection of training participants.
Most of the literature on the employment or earnings effects of training programs finds
a positive impact, but the results are typically based on selection-on-observables identi-
fication strategies.1 It is possible, however, that the assignment to a training program
depends upon characteristics of the unemployed which are not observed by the researcher,
but influence the individual’s employment chances. Therefore, we do not know to which
degree these findings reflect the true causal effect. At the same time, studies using exoge-
nous variation in program entry to account for selection on unobservables are quite rare,
despite the burgeoning literature on training.2 This paper attempts to fill this gap using
the arguably widespread phenomenon of end-of-year spending as a novel instrument for
training participation.
To do so, we exploit the spending incentives created by strict budget rules within the
Federal Employment Office (FEO) in West Germany during the 1980s and early 1990s,
which caused exogenous variation in program entry. Specifically, local employment offices
(LEOs) were subject to two rules: First, their annual budgets were determined primarily
based on their spending needs in the previous year. And second, funds allocated to training
programs in one calendar year could not be transferred in any way, i.e., neither to finance
training programs in the following year nor towards other labor market programs in the
same year. Combined, these rules created a strong incentive for local officials to use their
1See e.g. the surveys in Heckman et al. (1999),Card et al. (2010),Card et al. (2015), or Martin (2015)
and the literature review in section 2 below.
2Again, see Card et al. (2010, 2015) and the literature review in section 2 below. The study by Fro¨lich
and Lechner (2010) is a notable exception.
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whole budget for training programs in each fiscal year. As a consequence, an unemployed
had a higher probability to get selected for public-sponsored training in the last months
of a calendar year, if her LEO needed to spend down remaining funds, independent of the
personal circumstances of the unemployed or her labor market prospects. We therefore
use the variation in the financial situation of LEOs in the mid-term review to instrument
the individual participation in a training program during the remainder of the year.
With this approach, our paper makes three important contributions to the literature.
First, we examine the causal effect of training participation using a novel identification
strategy. In particular, we exploit the end-of-year spending behavior of agencies as source
of conditional exogenous variation for the treatment probability. Second, we implement
our instrumental variable (IV) strategy not only with the conventional 2SLS estimator,
but also using a flexible form of the two-step control function approach for random coef-
ficients models described by Wooldridge (2014). Both account for selection with respect
to observed and unobserved characteristics, but shed light on the impact of training for
different populations of individuals. On the one hand, 2SLS estimates the local average
treatment effect (LATE) for the group of compliers, i.e., for those unemployed who par-
ticipate in training only because unexpected funding is available and needs to be spent.
On the other hand, we can use the control function approach to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for all participants. The contrast between these
two IV estimates is interesting in its own right, since the impact of training may well
be heterogeneous across individuals. If individuals with higher benefits from training are
typically assigned first, it could be the case that unexpected additional resources do not
produce the employment effects hoped for. Finally, by extending the period of examina-
tion after program participation to up to ten years, we provide evidence on the long-run
effects of training. These are important, as the costs of assigning an unemployed to a
training programs are large and have to be recouped by positive effects on employment
for some time after treatment start.
Our main source of data for this study involves administrative records from the German
FEO containing the complete employment information up until 2004 for a random sample
of 50% of all individuals entering a training programs for the unemployed in Germany
between 1980 and 1993, as well as a 3% random sample of all unemployed who did not
participate in any such program over the same time period. The data involve spells in
unemployment and training as well as spells in employment. We combine these individual
level data with information on actual and planned spending from the annual reports of
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the FEO. Our rich data enable us to both estimate the size of first-semester deficits
or surpluses for each LEO based on actual participation patterns and follow individual
employment records up to ten years after treatment start. Furthermore, as we also observe
the individuals’ labor market participation since 1975, we can additionally control for their
employment history prior to the start of unemployment or training.
The first stage estimates show a significant increase in the individual probability to
enter a training program after the summer holidays if the respective responsible LEO
was thrifty in the first half of the year and had many resources left, i.e., ran a “relative
surplus”compared to the other LEOs. The reverse holds for people living in regions whose
employment office had a “relative deficit” and thus less funds for the rest of the year than
the average. This pattern suggests that spending the entire assigned budget and signaling
sustained need for the future was among the goals of the employment offices. Using our
instrument, we then provide 2SLS estimates of the employment effects of training for the
compliers and estimates of the ATT based on the control function method described by
Wooldridge (2014).
Our findings show that there is no positive effect whatsoever of training on the employ-
ment chances of the unemployed, when they are assigned to training in order to spent down
remaining funds. By contrast, the chances to be employed years after the treatment rise
on average by 12 percentage points in the long run for all training participants. This pro-
vides evidence that the fit between program and unemployed is significantly worse when
the participation originates from unexpected funding for training. Our results provide
evidence that training effects differ strongly due to differences in unobservables. Further,
we distinguish between different types of training programs. Here, long programs with
a strong focus on acquiring new skills fare much better than shorter programs in which
the unemployed improve basic skills or work in simulated firms to maintain their general
work skills. Thus, the analysis of the merits and costs of training programs should be
conducted individually rather than pooling all of them together.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a succint review of the related
literature on training. In section 3, we present detailed information on active labor market
policy in Germany during the time of our study. Section 4 describes the data. In section 5,
we introduce our instrumental variable, the relative surplus in the first half of each fiscal
year, and motivate the plausibility of our identification strategy. The basic estimation
approach, the construction of our evaluation sample and some descriptive statistics are
presented in section 6. Section 7 reports and discusses the empirical results obtained from
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2SLS. Section 8 then introduces the control function approach and presents the estimates
for the ATT. Section 9 involves the estimation of employment effects for different types of
training programs. Section 10 concludes. Further details on the data and the econometric
approach can be found in the appendix.
2 Related literature
The literature on the effectiveness of training programs carefully attempts to address the
possible selection bias associated with training participation. In short, if only those unem-
ployed participate in a training measure who have good chances to find a job afterwards
anyway, comparing the later employment status of participants and nonparticipants does
not allow to estimate the causal average effect of the program, but simply picks up the
difference in the underlying ability to take advantage of the newly gained knowledge, expe-
rience, or skill. (Dynamic) matching approaches in a combination with flexible matching
techniques address this problem if the (dynamic) sorting is based on observable charac-
teristics, e.g., if the better educated have a higher probability to participate than the
low skilled. They can not account for selection based on unobservable characteristics,
however, like motivation, ambition, or discipline.
The empirical evidence on the employment and earnings effects of participation in
training based on a selection-on-observables identification strategy shows mostly small
positive effects.3 For the object of our study, training programs starting up to the early
1990s in West Germany, evidence based on large administrative data can be found e.g. in
Fitzenberger et al. (2008) and Lechner et al. (2011). Fitzenberger et al. (2008) follow the
dynamic evaluation approach proposed by Sianesi (2004, 2008). They estimate the long-
run employment effects of training programs for the unemployed in a dynamic context
conditional on the starting date of the treatment (treatment vs. waiting) and find both
a negative lock-in effect after program start and significantly positive employment effects
in the medium and long run. Lechner et al. (2011) estimate the effect of participation
versus nonparticipation in training, using hypothetical starting dates for the nontreated
individuals. The results are similar, however, suggesting negative employment effects in
3In a meta-analysis of 97 international studies conducted between 1995 and 2007, Card et al. (2010)
report that training programs seem to be ineffective in the short run, but tend to have positive medium-
and long-run effects. See also the surveys in Kluve (2010), Card et al. (2015), and Martin (2015) as well
as the literature reviews in the recent studies by Biewen et al. (2014), Heinrich et al. (2013), Osikominu
(2013), or Richardson and van den Berg (2013).
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the short run and positive employment effects in the long run, with retraining exhibiting
the largest positive effect on later employment with about 20 percentage points after eight
years.
However, it is possible that the assignment to a training program may depend upon
characteristics of the unemployed which are not observed by the researcher, but influ-
ence the individual’s employment chances (selection on unobservables). To our knowl-
edge, there are only few studies which take this possibility into account.4 For the U.S.,
Andersson et al. (2013) estimate the effect of training under the Work Investment Act
(WIA) contrasting different non-experimental approaches. They find that difference-in-
differences estimation and controlling for firm fixed-effects in a wage regression show little
effect on the estimates of training effects. Likewise, Caliendo et al. (2014) use survey
data on some variables typically not available in administrative data for Germany such as
personality traits, attitudes, and job search behavior. The study finds that some of them
are significant determinants of participation in training, but including them leaves the
effect estimates basically unchanged. In contrast, controlling for detailed labor market
histories is important (see also Biewen et al., 2014, on this point). However, it remains an
open question as to whether unobservable characteristics different to those considered by
Caliendo et al. (2014) could play a role. This could be addressed using the IV method,
but IV studies are very rare in the literature on training programs for the unemployed
due to the lack of plausible instruments (see Fro¨lich and Lechner, 2010, who use regional
variation in program assignment, for a notable exception).5
4Again, see Card et al. (2010, 2015). For the U.S., Ham and LaLonde (1996) show the importance
to account for selection on unobservables when estimating the effects of training on duration outcomes.
In Europe, Richardson and van den Berg (2013) find negative consequences of long training programs in
Sweden, while Osikominu (2013) observes positive long-run effects for Germany. Both studies are based
on the timing-of-events approach of Abbring and van den Berg (2004) in continuous time, which assumes
time-invariant random effects independent of the covariates governing the selection process. Conditional
on these random effects, program participation at any point in time is random and only affects exits
from unemployment in the future. Aakvik et al. (2005) investigate the impact of Norwegian vocational
rehabilitation programs on employment using discrete choice models in a latent index framework with
unobservables generated by a normal factor structure and find negative training effects after controlling
for selection on observables and unobservables. For Germany, Fitzenberger et al. (2010) use Bayesian
techniques in a dynamic framework in discrete time to model selection into and out of training and
employment based on observed as well as unobserved characteristics. The study finds positive employment
effects.
5Fro¨lich and Lechner (2010) examine rich administrative data for Switzerland and exploit exogenous
differences of participation probabilities within local labor markets as an instrument for training partic-
ipation. For the analysis, they use a combination of conditional IV and matching methods to estimate
the average treatment effect of participation for compliers.
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3 Training programs for the unemployed in Germany
The conduct of training programs for the unemployed has a long history in Germany,
dating back to the enactment of the Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz )
in 1969. This legislation introduced a variety of instruments of active labor market policy
(ALMP), with public-sponsored training programs (Fortbildung und Umschulung) as the
most important component at that time.6 These programs vary strongly with respect
to the intended aim of qualification and their duration, ranging from only few weeks for
short-term training to a maximum of three years for complete retraining programs. Their
overarching goal is the same, however: To provide general or specific occupational skills in
order to improve the labor market prospects of unemployed individuals and those at risk of
unemployment. To achieve this aim, the FEO provides financial support for participants
which may contain both income maintenance payments and the costs of the program,
including money for travel, childcare, and accommodation expenditures. The overall
budget available for training programs and income maintenance for program participants
totaled around 3.4 billion Deutsche Mark in the mid-1980s (close to 1.7 billion Euros),
representing about 11.4% of the annual budget of the FEO at the time.7
A detailed description of the various types of training programs can be found in Ben-
der et al. (2005) and Fitzenberger et al. (2008). In this paper, we concentrate our analysis
on the four most important ones: Short-term training (Kurzzeitmaßnahmen), Practice
Firms (U¨bungsfirmen), Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (Bereit-
stellung von spezifischen Kenntnissen und beruflichen Fa¨higkeiten), and Retraining (Um-
schulung).8 In the following, we briefly describe each of these programs in turn, sorted by
their average planned duration.
Short-Term Training (STT) courses with an intended duration of no more than six
weeks focused on hard-to-place and low-skilled individuals. They were intended to inform
job seekers about employment options and possibilities for participation in more com-
prehensive programs, as well as to provide participants with suitable employer contacts.
Furthermore, individuals were taught some general labor market relevant skills, including
job search assistance, counseling, and communication training. In general, participants
6Other major labor market policy instruments are employment creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungs-
maßnahmen), promotion of vocational training (Fo¨rderung der beruflichen Ausbildung), occupational
rehabilitation (Berufliche Rehabilitation), and short-time work (Kurzarbeit).
7Own calculations based on figures from the reports of the FEO (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, 1993).
8For the classification of programs, we follow the definitions developed by Fitzenberger and Speckesser
(2007).
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did not have to take an exam at the end of the course and did not obtain any official certifi-
cate at the end (Schneider, 1981). Due to tight budgets after the German re-unification,
STT programs existed only until the end of 1992, before they gained importance again
with another program design starting in 1997 (Fitzenberger et al., 2013).
Practice Firms (PF) involve a simulated firm environment where participants practice
everyday work activities, focusing either on technical or commercial tasks. The program
usually lasts six months and aims at providing participants with general skills appropriate
for a wide range of jobs. Additionally, PFs are used to assess the participants’ ability for
particular professions. Similar to STT, participants do not receive a certificate, since the
program concentrates on exercising existing skills rather than learning new ones.
Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST) programs focus on providing more
specific human capital like computer or accounting courses. The goal of SPST is to
facilitate the reintegration of unemployed individuals into the labor market by improving
their skills and providing signals to potential employees. A completed vocational training
degree is usually required to take part in this type of training. The courses focus on
classroom training, but may also provide some practical experience. In case of successful
completion, participants usually earn a certificate describing the content of the course and
the newly acquired knowledge and experience. Due to the wide variety of courses with
durations from several months to up to two years, SPST is the most flexible program and
represents the largest share among all public-sponsored training programs.
Finally, the longest and most expensive programs organized by the FEO are Retraining
(RT) courses. The difference between retraining and the programs described above is that
participants actually complete a full vocational training. Most participants in RT already
hold a different vocational training degree for a specific occupation, but the prospect of
finding a job in that profession is small. Furthermore, RT is also an option for individ-
uals without any vocational degree, provided they meet additional eligibility criteria. In
general, it combines both theoretical and practical training, with a total duration of up
to three years. After successful completion, participants obtain a widely accepted formal
certificate, which serves as a signal for new job qualification.
To qualify for these training programs, unemployed individuals have to fulfill certain
requirements, e.g., having worked for at least one year prior to getting unemployed or
being entitled to unemployment benefits or subsequent unemployment assistance (Bender
et al., 2005; Lechner et al., 2011). Furthermore, full-time enrolled unemployed receive
income maintenance payments throughout the duration of their training.
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4 Data sources
In this study, we use a unique data set combining information from different administrative
sources on training program participation in Germany.9 The two main components are the
Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB)10 and the FuU data on program participation.
The IEB data are based on administrative daily spells reported by employers or the FEO.
They contain employment register information for all employees subject to social insurance
contributions for the years from 1975 to the end of 2004, thus providing exceptionally long
panel data on employment and unemployment periods, benefit receipt from the FEO, and
a wide range of personal and job-specific characteristics. Our second data source, the FuU
data set consists of monthly information about participation in public-sponsored training
programs between 1980 and 1997, collected by the FEO for controlling and statistical
purposes. This allows to look at further details of program participation and enables a
more precise and detailed identification of the exact training measure. After merging the
two sources, the identification of training programs is based on combining participation
information from FuU data with transfer payment information from the IEB data, giving
priority to the former.
As starting point for the construction of our sample, we combine information from a
50% sample of participants in training programs from the FuU data with a 50% sample of
program participants from the IEB data. In addition, we use a 3% sample from the IEB
data without any program participation as control group, together with individuals who
only entered a program at a later point in time.11 The calculation of average outcomes
based on the raw data for aggregates at the local level uses all treated and controls applying
the aforementioned sampling weights. Because the 3% control sample is still very large
regarding the absolute number of individuals compared to the treatment sample, the
relative weight of a treated individual is five times the weight of an individual in the
control sample for the estimation of treatment effects. In each data source, we only
9The data was generated as part of the project “Policy Change, Effect Heterogeneity, and the Long-
Run Employment Effects of Further Training” (IAB project Nr. 1213-10-38009). For the preparation, we
used the well documented experience of Stefan Bender, Annette Bergemann, Bernd Fitzenberger, Michael
Lechner, Ruth Miquel, Stefan Speckesser, and Conny Wunsch. The main advantage of the new data is
its large sample size. While Bender et al. (2005) merely used a 1% sample, the current study is based on
a 50% samples for training participants.
10In contrast to the standard version of the IEB, our data only contain information from BeH
(Bescha¨ftigten-Historik) and LeH (Leistungsempfa¨nger-Historik of the IAB).
11We identify program participants in the IEB data on the basis of transfer payment information, i.e.,
whether they obtained income maintenance payments of the type that indicates the participation in a
training program.
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consider information starting in 1980 for reasons of data reliability. Further information
on the construction of the data set and the weighting procedure is provided in appendix
A.1.
The resulting data set is very informative for two reasons: First, it involves unusually
long panel information on employment and unemployment spells from 1980 to the end
of 2004, giving us the opportunity to examine the effect of training up to ten years after
the treatment. Second, its large size means we have enough observations to conduct the
analysis on a local level and to additionally look at the effects of individual programs.
5 “Relative surplus” as instrument
To estimate the impact of training participation on subsequent employment, we need to
address various potential sources for selection bias. First, it may be the case that those
unemployed individuals are more likely to participate in training who are more able, mo-
tivated, and ambitious, and would therefore find it easier to get a job anyway. Second,
caseworkers at the local employment offices could base their decisions about a) whether
to offer a training opportunity to an unemployed, and b) which type of program seems
most appropriate, on their personal assessment of the potential benefits of participation
for the respective individual. Third, unemployed may be assigned to training because
of their particularly bad employment chances. While the first and second source would
lead to a positive selection of participants, the opposite would happen if the third source
dominated. In all three cases, we may obtain biased estimates of the effect of train-
ing participation on employment for any evaluation relying on a selection-on-observables
identification strategy, if we do not observe all information available to the caseworker.
This paper attempts to come closer to estimating causal effects by exploiting budget
rules for active labor market policies in Germany which create a source of exogenous
variation in training probabilities. In this section, we present the institutional background
at the time of our analysis that motivates our instrument and describe the construction
of our measure of relative unexpected budget surplus.
5.1 Institutional background
Up until 1994, the most important aspects in the organizational structure of the FEO and
its budgeting system for the purpose of this study were the following: (a) The FEO was
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organized in three levels, with the central office in Nuremberg, nine regional employment
offices at the intermediate level, and 142 LEOs at the lowest organizational level. As
depicted in figure 1, the regional employment offices largely corresponded to the states
in West Germany, with exceptions for small states, on the one hand, and Bavaria, on
the other, which is divided into two regions. (b) The total budget was determined and
managed largely by the central office of the FEO, especially for all entitlement programs
like income maintenance and training programs for the unemployed (Fertig and Schmidt,
2000). Local offices possessed limited discretion in the use of their allocated funds for
training programs. (c) The budget for training programs was planned and allocated
separately from other programs like job creation schemes and could not be transferred
to other purposes. (d) The allocation of funds top-down to the regional and local offices
was based primarily on past levels of program participation, but adjusted for anticipated
changes in need across the different regions. (e) Unused funds from one fiscal year could
not be transferred to the following year.12
Together these budget rules substantially affected the management of training pro-
grams for the unemployed by the LEOs. Most importantly, as the budget for the next
year depended on the degree of utilization in the current year and its comparison with
other local offices, each LEO had an incentive to spend its whole budget before the end
of the year, because otherwise it ran the risk of losing funds for the following year. The
probability for this was even greater when the other offices did exhaust their budget and
could thus plausibly claim their needs for the next year. However, local officials could
not simply overrun their allocated resources every year to secure a continuous rise of its
funding, as that would have triggered enquiries by the FEO and possibly accusations of
inefficient management. As a consequence, the best outcome in the self interest of local
decision makers seemed to be to use the whole budget in a year in order to guarantee a
stable and possibly growing budget for the next years. Therefore, the degree to which the
budget was spent at the time of the midterm review most likely influenced the decision to
assign an additional unemployed into training later-on. If budgets were almost exhausted,
caseworkers may have hesitated more in assigning further participants. If resources were
abundant and needed to be deployed, on the other hand, the chance to be selected to a
training program increased.
12This institutional framework remained stable up until 1994, when new rules granted a modest level
of budget autonomy to the local employment offices. In 1998, a global budgeting system was introduced
to make the budget system at the FEO even more flexible.
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There is a lot of anecdotal and suggestive evidence for end-of-year spending behavior in
government agencies and company divisions (examples include Comptroller General, 1980,
Douglas and Franklin, 2006, and McPherson, 2007, for the former, and Merchant, 1985, for
the latter), but there is hardly any empirical evidence on its effects due to a lack of reliable
data (General Accounting Office, 1998). To our knowledge, the only empirical study is
Liebman and Mahoney (2013), who investigate IT procurement decisions of various US
federal agencies and find evidence for higher spending on lower quality projects in the last
week of the fiscal year.
For our analysis, we use the remaining financial leeway after the first half of the year
as a measure for the magnitude of possible end-of-year spending behavior of local officials,
which then serves as instrument for program participation in this region in the following
months. Figure 2 displays the timing of events in the budgeting process of the LEOs to
illustrate this approach. The review of the first semester typically took place in July after
all the information regarding the first six months was available. The financial situation
at this point relative to the other LEOs then influenced the participation decisions in the
remaining months of the year after the summer holidays. Due to a rotation system for the
summer holidays between the German states, the “end-of-year” period in our examination
therefore starts either in August or September depending on the region and year under
consideration and ends in November as the costs for entries in December count towards
the January budget.13
This strategy is supported by the following two arguments, both originating from
personal interviews and correspondence with FEO experts and practitioners. First, the
non-transferability of funds between different years caused caseworkers to set program
starts as early as possible during a calendar year in order to ensure that available funds
were spent during that fiscal year. Second, holiday periods needed to be taken into account
for the planning, as many training providers did not offer courses during vacations. This
is because the programs required a stable group size and an economically viable number of
participants. Therefore, the usual point in time for readjustments in program assignments
in response to higher or lower spending during the first semester was after the summer
holidays, which ended in August or September depending on state and year.
The evidence in figure 3 supports this reasoning. It shows the average distribution of
entries into all considered training programs over the year. We can see that there is a
13We treat August as the first month of our examination period for a particular region and year if at
most half of the workdays in August belonged to the school holidays, and September otherwise.
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pronounced seasonal pattern with many entries during the first semester and a large spike
after the summer holidays. In contrast, entry is lowest in June, July, and December. This
suggests that caseworkers took the summer holidays as well as the end of the fiscal budget
year into account, with training providers accommodating this seasonality of program
starts. The next section describes the computation of the instrument in detail.
5.2 The derivation of the relative budget surplus
We follow five steps to construct our instrument “relative surplus”: (1) We count the
number of program entries in each region for every year and month between January 1980
and December 1993 from our data. (2) We predict the planned entries into training at the
local level for each year (i.e., the “budget”) based on the entry patterns of the previous
three years. This means that 1983 is the first year in our analysis, as the information for
1980 to 1982 is used in the construction of the instrument. (3) We adjust the resulting
number by the percentage change in the annual federal budget for training measures to
incorporate common macroeconomic effects. (4) We compute a measure for the size of
the budget that is still disposable at the time of the mid-term review for each LEO l in
year τ as follows:
(1) Budget leewaylτ =
Planned entrieslτ (1− 12)− Actual entrieslτ (1− 6)
Eligible unemployed in Julylτ [in1, 000]
,
where the arguments (1-12) and (1-6) refer to months 1 to 12 and 1 to 6 in year τ ,
respectively. We subtract the number of actual entries (1-6) during the first six months in
year τ from the planned entries (1-12) for the entire year, corresponding to our predicted
budget, and normalize by the number of eligible unemployed in that district in July (in
1,000) as a measure of potential training participants. The resulting budget leeway thus
proxies the chance to be assigned to training in the second semester of the calendar year.
It increases with the magnitude of the remaining budget and it is positive as long as a
local office did not assign more people to training measures in the first half of the year
than its total budget for that year. (5) We calculate the average budget leeway for all
other offices s 6= l for each year τ and subtract it from the result of region l in that year
to obtain our instrument “relative surplus”:
(2) Relative surpluslτ = Budget leewaylτ − 1
L− 1
∑
s 6=l
Budget leewaysτ .
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On the one hand, this controls for common macroeconomic or financial shocks, as they
would be equally reflected in the leeway of district l and the average of the other districts,
thus canceling each other out. On the other hand, it additionally incorporates the behav-
ioral aspect that local officials in districts with abundant remaining resources may feel a
much greater need to spend it if the other districts are already running a tight budget
than if they had no financial worries as well. Likewise, LEOs with a high rate of program
entries in the first half of the year may not cut back spending too strongly if the situation
is the same in the other districts as well, giving them an excuse for not imposing a stricter
control over their expenditures.
The resulting value of relative surplus can be positive or negative (i.e., a “relative
deficit”), depending on the LEO‘s position relative to the other offices. It thus proxies
the financial leeway a LEO possesses at the end of the summer compared to the other
districts and serves as our instrument for starting a training program during the fall.
Two issues of this approach need to be discussed in more detail. One is our use of
program entries to proxy the budget. To our knowledge, monthly information on actual
and planned expenditures for the 142 LEOs is not available for that time period, so we
cannot calculate our instrument from financial figures only. On the other hand, the budget
rules at the time in fact involved a direct link between program entries and available funds
based on head counts (Bach et al., 1993). Since money allocated to training programs
could not be transferred to other ALMP programs (and vice versa), there was no way to
spend it on other items. This resulted in a close relationship between annual budgets and
the number of participants. Furthermore, the planning and allocation of resources was
done for training programs as a whole, that is, not distinguishing between the different
program types.
The second issue is how to get the exact numbers for the respective quantities. Based
on our 50% sample of all program participants, we can compute the number of new
participants by district and year with high precision. However, determining the number
of planned entries into all training programs is more complex. Here, we estimate it for
each of the 142 districts based on separate out-of-sample predictions. That is, for each
LEO and year between 1983 and 1993, we use the data on the number of entries during the
three preceding years (in logs) and regress entries in one year on its first lag, the monthly
entries and local unemployment rates during the second half of the preceeding year (both
in logs), a full set of district dummies, and year as a continuous variable. Then, we use the
estimated coefficients together with the actual data to predict the annual entries for the
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current year. Note that the model used for the prediction of planned entries is estimated
separately for each year τ and the model estimates are only based on past data for the
years τ − 3 to τ − 1. The predictions for year τ therefore exclusively rely on information
available at the end of year τ − 1.
To increase the precision of this prediction and strengthen the link between our fore-
casting procedure and the ex-ante planned budget, we account for foreseeable changes in
the total number of program participants on the national level by including a correction
for changes in planned spending on training programs at the federal level, as indicated
above in step 3. For this purpose, we calculate the ratio between intended spending in a
certain year, say 1988, and actual spending in the previous year, here 1987. A ratio less
than one implies a planned reduction of overall money for training programs and likewise
in the absolute number of entrants compared to the preceding year. For the analysis,
we multiply the raw predictions of the absolute number of entries with this ratio. The
resulting variable does a very good job in explaining the variation in the real annual entry
rates, with an R2 of 81.97 in a regression of actual entries on our predicted ones.
5.3 Validity of the instrument
Figure 4 reports the distribution of relative surplus. By construction, it has a mean of
basically 0, while the median is negative at -4.65. This means that the distribution of
relative surplus is slightly skewed to the right and that the budget leeway for the second
semester was a bit smaller in the median LEO than the average of the other districts. In
other words, the median district spent a bit more than the average in the first semester,
which is plausible if local officials care about showing that they actually need all of their
budget. Compared to the overall monthly average of 8.45 entries into training programs
per 1,000 eligible unemployed during the whole time period, this “excess spending” over
the first half of the year amounts to the typical inflow of about two to three weeks.
Additionally, figure 4 shows a large variation in relative surplus across region and year.
While the majority of observations lie between -30 and +30 from the national average (the
standard deviation is 34.5), some LEOs even experienced relative surpluses or deficits of
more than 70 in some years, with extreme values of up to -95 and +167 at the tails of the
distribution. As a consequence, some LEOs are very likely to expand training programs
after the summer holidays in order to spend their whole budget, whereas others needed to
restrict their spending substantially if they wanted to prevent exceeding their funds and
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getting reproached for that. In section 7.1, we show that this is in fact the case. Thus, the
budget leeway significantly affects the probability of eligible unemployed to be assigned
to a training program during the remainder of the year.
Exclusion restriction
Apart from possessing a relevant impact on the treatment probability, it is crucial for
the validity of our approach that our instrument does not directly influence the outcome
variable, i.e., that relative surplus only affects later employment through its impact on
the treatment probability. Put differently, it is necessary that relative surplus contains
a high degree of randomness and is not influenced by any omitted variable that may
simultaneously impact the respective district’s labor market in the long-run. So what
could be potential threats to the validity of our instrument and how do we deal with
them?
First, and most importantly, the budget surplus may proxy for local labor market con-
ditions. Specifically, a budget surplus may be associated with particularly good local labor
market conditions. To account for this possibility, our specification of the employment
equation controls for differences in local labor market conditions by including several vari-
ables capturing the level and dynamics of local unemployment. These include the average
local unemployment rate from the previous year as well as the monthly unemployment
rates for each month from January to July in the current year.14 Additionally, we also
control for persistent differences across regions. Second, the LEOs may differ in the qual-
ity and style of their management, as well as by their seasonal pattern of demand for
training programs, which could explain some variation in the instrument. To take this
into account, we also include the relative surplus in the previous year in the employment
equation, thus netting out any potential differences between the managements of the dis-
tricts. Third, developments at the federal level could influence both the LEO’s budget
situation and the employability of participants. This should not be problematic in our
approach, as we compare each single district with the other LEOs in the construction of
the instrument and additionally introduce year fixed effects in the regressions. Thus, any
macroeconomic shock that affects the districts more or less equally does not harm our
identification strategy. The same holds for any unexpected change in the organization
of the federal employment office or across-the-board adjustments in spending on training
14Unobserved personal characteristics of the unemployed should not play a role here, although they may
strongly influence employment. This is due to the construction of relative surplus at a more aggregate
level, where there is no obvious link between the instrument and unobserved individual characteristics.
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programs which could be related to the national economic situation. And finally, we con-
trol for persistent level differences and diverging time trends between regions by including
regional fixed effects and interactions between year and region dummies.
After adding the aforementioned controls, the remaining conditional variation in our
relative surplus variable reflects unexpected changes in the micro-environment of each
LEO. On the demand side, these may include unanticipated shifts in the type of unem-
ployed and their need for training. On the supply side, we may see changes of personnel
or absences of caseworkers in the employment office, as well as changes in management
and policy style. Furthermore, local training providers may adjust their services and how
they match with the interest of the unemployed and local employers. And finally, the
relative surplus variable may also be affected by changes in the majority of the other
LEOs, which are not under the control of the officials in an individual district. As all of
these sources are sporadic and unsystematic, we do not observe extended periods of large
relative surpluses or deficits for any employment office in our data once we condition on
our set of control variables. This conclusion is supported by the statistical finding that
the residuals of our conditional instrument, after controlling for the other covariates in
the employment equation, are not autocorrelated over time, i.e., shocks to the relative
surplus in one year are already absorbed in the following year.
6 Implementation and descriptive statistics
6.1 Construction of sample and estimation approach
For the implementation of our IV identification strategy, we define our sample to achieve
two goals: On the one hand, we want to restrict our analysis on the group of unemployed
individuals who are eligible for participation in training programs and who are the main
target group. We do not consider programs related to youth unemployment, early retire-
ment, or the reintegration of former inmates, and we focus on individuals living in West
Germany who are between 25 and 50 at the beginning of their unemployment spell, have
worked for at least three months before losing their job, and receive either unemployment
benefits or assistance within the first quarter of unemployment at the latest. Furthermore,
we exclude observations that enter unemployment at a certain point in time and remain
16
without employment for more than 72 calendar months due to issues of data quality.15
We need to account for the dynamic sorting of individuals into the treatment with
respect to elapsed unemployment duration in order to ensure the comparability with
the members of the comparison group of nontreated individuals. To do so, we use a
dynamic risk set matching approach following Li et al. (2001) and Sianesi (2004, 2008).16
To implement it, we estimate flexible panel employment regressions. In contrast to the
literature, we choose to implement risk set matching in a regression setting because this
allows naturally for IV estimation.
For a random sample of unemployed, who are eligible at elapsed duration el = 1, ..., 12
months, we define treatment as the first participation in training programs during the first
12 months of the respective unemployment spell. Risk set matching compares a person
entering a training program after a certain elapsed duration of unemployment only to
those observations who became unemployed in the same month, who are still searching,
and who have not started training yet. The latter comparison group thus includes those
who either never participate in a training program or who start it later. To implement
the risk set matching approach in regression analysis and construct a sample by potential
treatment starts, all individuals are replicated for each month they remain unemployed and
are eligible for treatment or just start one. When we estimate the outcome equation for
employment by month since treatment start, we account for the fact that the composition
of treated and nontreated individuals depends upon the elapsed duration in months. For
example, if an individual starts a treatment in month 7 of the unemployment spell and
does not find a job before month 8, the individual is used as control observation for
treatment starts during months 1 to 6 and as treatment observation for month 7. If an
individual enters unemployment more than once during our period of observation, she is
part of different unemployment cohorts and thus appears several times in the empirical
analysis. Through the alignment by elapsed unemployment duration, our estimation
approach estimates the average treatment effect for the treated, who start treatment in
month el of their unemployment spell, which would be the ATT under a selection-on-
observables assumption. The average effect estimates for participation during the first
twelve months of unemployment average across the 12 months of potential treatment
starts, which are weighted by the monthly number of entries into treatment. When
15In particular, many of these long-term unemployment spells may be caused by gaps in the employment
history, which are considered as non-employment in the data.
16See also Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) for a related approach and Biewen et al. (2014), Fitzen-
berger et al. (2013), or Lechner et al. (2011) for applications.
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estimating a conventional two-stage-least-squares regression in this setting, we estimate
the LATE among the compliers, i.e. those treated whose treatment status is changed by
the variation of the instrument.
Using the risk set matching approach, we effectively estimate the effect of training
versus waiting, where non-treatment up to a certain elapsed unemployment duration el
involves the possibility to be treated later during the course of the unemployment spell.
Our analysis starts with those observations who entered a training program in August
1983, therefore including individuals who became unemployed between September 1982
and July 1983. We cluster the standard errors in our regression analysis at the district
and year level because the instrument only varies between district-year cells.
6.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides the relevant sample sizes of treatment and control group by length of
unemployment at program start. It shows that the absolute number of entries into training
programs declines with a longer duration of unemployment, reflecting the fact that the
number of individuals in a cohort falls as more and more of them find a job. At the
same time, the fraction of people who start a program increases continuously from 4.8%
in the first quarter of unemployment up to 6.1% in the fourth quarter.17 This may reflect
that both the unemployed and their caseworkers find such programs more necessary the
longer unemployment lasts. Additionally, we also show the number of participants in the
different types of training measures to provide a sense of their relative importance. In
particular, we can see that the diverse training programs summed up in the category SPST
(provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques) are the most frequently used,
accounting for more than half of all the program participations (51.7%). The remainder is
almost evenly split between the long-running retraining (26%) and the two short measures
short-term training and practice firms (22.3%).
Table 2 involves a comparison of individuals in the treatment and control group with
respect to the main personal characteristics like gender, age, education, and marital sta-
tus, but also considering very detailed information about previous work and training
biographies. This includes previous employment status, wage, the type of employment,
the occupation, and the size of the last firm worked in, as well as whether one partic-
17Note that these unweighted numbers reflect the situation in our evaluation sample in which treated
individuals are over-represented by a factor of 182 to 12, see section 4. The fraction of program starts is
much smaller in the population, but the relative changes are correctly represented in our sample.
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ipated in a training program within the last year or two years before. Bold numbers
indicate statistically significant differences in the averages between the two groups. Thus,
it turns out that participants differ significantly from nonparticipants regarding almost all
characteristics considered. For instance, participants are 5 percentage points more likely
to be in the youngest age group (25-29 years) than nonparticipants, but 6 percentage
points less likely to be in the oldest (45-50 years). This is consistent with training being
a human capital investment, paying off the longer the younger the age at the time of
training. Likewise, we observe smaller fractions of married individuals and foreign citi-
zens among the treated in all programs compared to the control group (44.9% to 47.4%
and 7.1% to 11.8%, respectively). This fits to the investment logic, as married individuals
are older on average than singles, and foreigners may consider a return migration, thus
having a shorter expected payoff period. Apart from that, the participants are also more
likely to be female than the nonparticipants (44.9% to 40%) and earned slightly higher
wages in previous employment (3.83 to 3.79), in which they were more likely to work as
a white-collar worker (41.6% to 31.6%), mostly in the service sector (59.7% to 53.2%).
Looking at the different types of training programs individually, we see some indica-
tions that they focus on different groups of unemployed. For instance, the age pattern
described above is most pronounced for retraining, the longest and at the same time
most expensive program with a duration of around three years. Likewise, we observe a
lower share of individuals with at least some college education in short-term training and
practice firms, as these are mostly focused on acquiring and maintaining more basic and
practical skills.
Overall, these differences both between participants and nonparticipants and across
programs reveal a strong selection with respect to observed characteristics. This highlights
the challenge faced by an identification strategy based on the selection-on-observables as-
sumption. If participation follows an investment logic as discussed above, it is likely that
the returns to training differ systematically not only by observed, but also some unob-
served characteristics (see Card, 2001, regarding heterogeneity in returns to education).
7 OLS and LATE employment effects
This section presents OLS coefficients and standard IV estimates based on 2SLS, as well
as results from a reduced form model using our budget instrument as main explanatory
variable. 2SLS estimates the local average treatment effect (LATE) of training for the
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compliers, who are those individuals who would not have taken part in any program
in the absence of a spending rush at the end of the budget year. Note that OLS and
LATE estimates may differ because of selection on unobservables or because compliers
and always-takers react systematically different to the treatment. We explore this issue
further in section 8 using the control function method for random-coefficients models
described by Wooldridge (2014), which enables us to estimate the average treatment
effects for the treated (ATT).
7.1 First stage: Effect of surplus on participation in training
The first step in the analysis is to check whether our instrument has predictive power
for the probability to start a training program, i.e., whether it is actually relevant. In
2SLS, we run a first stage OLS regression of the probability to enter one of the four
considered programs in the months after the summer holidays on the size of a district’s
relative budget surplus. As described above, we control for the first lag of the relative
surplus, personal characteristics, work biographies, indicators for each region and year,
their interactions, and the development in the local unemployment rate in order to focus
on the pure “surprise” effect of relative surplus.18 We estimate pooled monthly regressions
conditional on still being unemployed and not having entered a training program before
the month of interest.19
The resulting standardized coefficients for a one-deviation change in relative surplus
are reported in table 3, together with the corresponding clustered standard errors (at the
district and year level) and F-test statistics.20 The estimates show that the probability
to participate in the final months of the year reacts to our measure of relative surplus
during the first semester. An increase of one standard deviation in the relative surplus
leads to a modest, but significant, change of 2.6 percentage points (ppoints, rounded
to the first decimal point) in the participation probability in the first specification, in
which we control for regional and year fixed effects as well as a large number of personal
18Appendix A.3 provides a detailed description of all explanatory variables used in the analysis.
19Since the share of the treatment group is very small in the full sample and we estimate the treatment
probability by elapsed unemployment duration, 2SLS may lead to noisy and unstable results (see Chiburis
et al., 2012). For this reason, we increase the weight of the treatment group relative to the control group
by a factor of five, and we do not apply population weights (see Solon and Wooldrige, 2015, for a discussion
of weighting in regression analysis), except for reweighting the treated and nontreated in the comparison
group used in the risk-set matching approach, see section 4 and appendix A.1.
20Estimating the same equation with a non-linear Probit model yields average partial effects of the
same sign and order of magnitude.
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characteristics of the unemployed. This effect decreases a bit when we sequentially add
the first lag of relative surplus, region and year interactions, and controls for the local
unemployment rate over the previous months and the past year, but consistently remains
positive and significant. In our preferred and most conservative specification (column 5),
a marginal change of one standard deviation in relative surplus (roughly, 34.5 in absolute
value) leads to an increase in the participation probability of 1.9 ppoints. Relative to the
average treatment probability in our weighted sample of 65.8%, this represents an increase
of 2.8%.
This result is also robust to changes in the way we compute the instrument. In
particular, if we vary the number of years of information used to predict the number of
program entries to either two or four, we still obtain coefficients of the same order of
magnitude (1.8 and 1.6, respectively) and significance. The findings therefore indicate
that officials at the employment offices reacted to the budgetary environment with the
aim of spending unused funds by the end of the year (or to meet the budget in the case
of deficits). The corresponding F-statistic for the instrument is large and in all cases way
above 10, suggesting that relative surplus can be considered as a strong instrument.
7.2 Employment effects: OLS, reduced form, LATE
The estimated employment effects are reported in table 4. For simplicity and to gain
precision for the IV estimates, our outcome variable is the employment rate, i.e. the
average the month-specific employment dummies, for three time periods: The first year
after the start for the immediate short run, the second and third year capturing the
medium run, and years 4 to 10 for the long-run effects. For comparison, we report the
outcomes of different estimation methods for both specification 4 and 5 of the first stage,
where the difference lies in the use of the local unemployment rate in the previous year
as additional control. In column 1, we begin by stating the raw descriptive difference in
having a job between treatment and risk set comparison group observations. It starts with
a large difference of almost 20 ppoints in the first year after entering the training program,
which is as expected as participation reduces the job search activities of unemployed
individuals (the lock-in effect). This gap is still present in the second and third year, but
it shrinks already to only -5.4 ppoints, as most of the shorter programs have ended. In
the long-run, however, former participants in a publicly-sponsored training program are
on average 2.3 ppoints more likely to be employed than nonparticipants.
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These results are almost perfectly mirrored in columns 2 and 3, displaying the coeffi-
cients of an OLS regression of employment on a participation dummy and our extensive
set of controls.21 Columns 4 and 5 show the coefficients of reduced form regressions,
where we simply replace the binary participation dummy by our continuous instrument.
The sizes of the coefficients are thus not comparable to the previous ones any more, as
they indicate the change in employment rates for a marginal increase in relative surplus.
Nevertheless, the signs already give us an indication of the direction in which the IV
estimates should go. Interestingly, we observe a negative sign for the reduced form even
in the long-run period, questioning an overall positive effect of training for the compliers,
i.e., those unemployed who start training due to the respective LEO’s need to spend down
resources, but who would not have done so if less funding was available.
The 2SLS results based on two specifications are stated in columns 6 and 7. Column
7 shows our preferred specification which uses further controls for the local labor market
conditions. At first glance, the coefficients show worse employment effects compared to
OLS. While this is not the case in the first year after treatment start, the estimate amounts
to -10 ppoints during in the medium-run and, most importantly, to -3 ppoints the long-run
effect (in column 7). This suggests that the effect of taking part in a training program on
the compliers is unlikely to be positive. However, the 2SLS estimates are not statistically
significant and somewhat imprecise, which is also reflected in the differences between the
two specifications in columns 6 and 7.
8 Average treatment effect on the treated
2SLS estimates the average training effect for the compliers, which is identified under
fairly weak assumptions, if a suitable strong instrument is available. However, with
heterogeneous treatment effects the complier effect may differ strongly from the ATT,
which is typically the focus of studies in the training literature building on a selection-on-
observables strategy. In our specific application, the complier group involves individuals
who only participate in training if there are more funds available than expected earlier.
If training is well targeted on those with the highest returns of training and individual
returns are heterogeneous for unobservable reasons, we would expect that the ATT ex-
ceeds the LATE. Furthermore, the 2SLS estimates in this paper are imprecise and often
21Recall that any point estimate discussed here represents the weighted average of the separate estimates
by month of program entry during the first year of the unemployment spell.
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not significant. Estimating the ATT requires stronger modelling assumptions compared
to the LATE. However, under appropriate modelling assumptions, the ATT may be ob-
tained with more statistical precision than the LATE. To derive the ATT, we implement
a flexible two-step control function estimator for a random-coefficients model with both a
binary endogenous treatment and a binary outcome (see Wooldridge (2014)). As before,
we focus on the employment effect of participation in a training program compared to non-
or later participation. In the following, we sketch our implementation of the estimator
and refer to appendix A.2 for a formal description.22
8.1 Estimating the ATT
To implement a random coefficients model with both a binary endogenous treatment and
a fractional outcome variable (the employment rate of an individual within the three
time periods), we adopt a flexible control function approach for non-linear models with
discrete explanatory endogenous variables as described in Wooldridge (2014, section 6).
Wooldridge (2014) shows how the model can be used to obtain the average treatment
effect (ATE). We extend the approach to estimate the average effect of treatment on the
treated (ATT). The model accounts for a random coefficient of the training dummy, which
reflects the heterogeneity of the treatment effect unrelated to exogenous covariates.
Define d = 1 to indicate participation in training and d = 0 otherwise. According
to the risk set matching approach, we align individuals who start treatment in a certain
month of their unemployment spell with all individuals who have not started treatment
by that month, as measured by elapsed unemployment duration.23
In the first stage, we estimate pooled probit regressions for the treatment dummy d
for entries into training programs during the first twelve months of unemployment. As
covariates z, we use the regressors of the employment equation zi1 and our budget instru-
ment zi2. Then, we take the resulting coefficients to calculate the generalized residuals ĝr
as the treatment-status specific inverse Mills’ ratios.
For the second stage, we estimate fractional probits for employment, where the de-
pendent variables are employment rates during year 1, years 2 to 3, and years 4 to 10,
22For the results reported above, we use regression models which include an indicator variable for
treatment, but no interaction between the treatment dummy and observable covariates to account for
possible heterogeneity of the treatment effect. We re-estimated the OLS regressions with such interactions
and calculated the ATT explicitly as an average partial effect for these regressions. The results of this
exercise largely coincide with our former coefficient for the treatment dummy without interactions. The
detailed outcomes are available upon request.
23Note that the discussion here omits time indices for the month of treatment start or calendar time.
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calculated as the time averages of the monthly employment dummies. We account for
selection into treatment status by adding ĝr and interactions of ĝr with zi1 as control
functions. Furthermore, our model allows for a random coefficient of the training dummy
in the employment regression, which accounts for possible heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects. Finally, we routinely test for significance of interactions involving ĝr as part of the
specification search.
We estimate the following fractional probit for employment with control functions
based on the following specification of the expected employment rate in period t:
(3) Ê(yit | di, zi) = Φ
(
δˆ0t + δˆ1tdi + z1bˆ0 + z1δˆ1di + ωˆ0ĝri + ωˆ1ĝridi + zi1ĝriψˆ
)
,
where t corresponds to year 1, years 2 to 3, or years 4 to 10 after treatment start, Φ(.) is
the standard normal distribution function, δˆ0t, δˆ1t are time specific effects, and bˆ0, δˆ1, ωˆj
(j = 0, 1), ψˆ further coefficient estimates. Appendix A.2 provides a formal discussion of
the specification in equation (3).
Based on the results of equation (3), we then derive the ATT by integrating out the
distribution of the covariates and the control function terms among the treated di = 1 as:
(4) τ̂ATT,t =
1
N1
∑
di=1
{
Φ
(
δˆ0t + δˆ1t + z1bˆ0 + z1δˆ1 + ωˆ0ĝri + ωˆ1ĝri + zi1ĝriψˆ
)
− Φ
(
δˆ0t + z1bˆ0 + ωˆ0ĝri + zi1ĝriψˆ
)}
.
The first term in the difference denotes the employment probability for the treated, the
second for the nontreated. To estimate the ATT, the two terms have to include the
individual-specific control function corresponding to the treatment state considered.
Inference when estimating the fractional probit with control functions and the ATT
is based on a cluster version of the weighted bootstrap (see Barbe and Bertail, 1995, and
Fitzenberger and Muehler, 2015). We cluster standard errors at the district and year level
(see appendix A.2 for further details).
8.2 Results
Specification tests
We first use the data to determine appropriate specification of our control function. For
this purpose, we start with a flexible model that includes not only the generalized residuals
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obtained from the first stage, but also interactions between the generalized residual (gr),
the treatment dummy (d), and selected important covariates (X). We then test separately
whether the components of this general setup are (jointly) significant to obtain a model
that best explains the variation in employment probabilities. The results of these tests are
summarized in three different specifications in table 5, all of which use the set of control
variables of our benchmark model for the 2SLS results above.
In the first panel, CF 1, we start by including the generalized residuals and an interac-
tion with the treatment dummy (with coefficients ω0 and ω1, respectively). Here, we see
that the two components are not individually significant at the same time in either period
under consideration. The results of χ2-tests, however, show that they are jointly impor-
tant both for the first year and the long run, indicating a high degree of endogeneity in the
participation in training (the corresponding p-value is 0.000 in both cases). In CF 2, we
check whether we can reduce the importance of the selection terms by using the informa-
tion contained in the observable characteristics more flexibly. To this end, we additionally
include interaction terms between individual characteristics and the treatment dummy.
It turns out, however, that this is only the case in the first year after program start,
but starting with the second year, we find strong and significant indications for selection
effects (with p-values of 0.002 and 0.000 for the second and third period, respectively).
Finally, CF 3 adds a set of interaction terms between generalized residuals and individ-
ual characteristics (with the vector of coefficients ψ) to account for a possible heterogeneity
of selection effects. Here, the results of the two χ2-tests show that each set of variables
is jointly significant. This means that we not only have strong endogeneity in program
participation, but also that this selection varies by characteristics of the individual. To in-
corporate this finding in our analysis, we therefore use CF 3 as our preferred specification
for the estimation of our second stage.
Second stage results
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of the full-fledged control function approach, differing
only in whether we control for the local unemployment rate in the previous year or not.
In both cases, we state the estimates from our linear OLS and 2SLS models from before as
reference points.24 Then, we display the result of a probit model in order to show whether
24Note that OLS ATT estimates using interactions between the treatment dummy and exogenous con-
trols z1idi as in equation 3, fractional probit estimates, and semi-parametric estimates for the ATT based
on inverse probability weighting basically coincide with the effect estimates from the OLS regressions
estimating a uniform treatment effect, which are reported here. These further results are available upon
request.
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including possible non-linearities already leads to different results. Finally, we present
the ATTs of the control function approach obtained from each of the three specifications
discussed above, with CF3 as the preferred one.
Starting with table 6, three aspects seem to be particularly noteworthy: First, there
is no difference between the various methods with respect to the pattern of results they
produce. That is, all of them exhibit significant lock-in effects in the first year, slightly
better outcomes in the second, and even better results in the long run. Second, the
estimates obtained by selection-on-observables approaches (OLS and probit) are almost
identical, but differ strongly in the long run from those of the two IV approaches, although
we control for a large number of relevant explanatory variables. This shows that non-
linearity is not much of an issue here and provides another illustration for the presence
of strong selection into program participation and the great challenge of taking it into
account. Third, the comparison between 2SLS and CF estimates indicates two important
differences. On the one hand, the flexible specification of the selection correction yields
more precise estimates than the traditional 2SLS specification. In table 6, the resulting
standard errors are smaller in the control function approach by around 45% on average
over the different examination periods. On the other hand, we can see that the point
estimates deviate quite strongly between the two approaches. These differences are not
significant in the first and second period, but in the long run, we have a negative, but
insignificant 2SLS result of -8.3 ppoints in contrast to a significant positive effect of 10.1
ppoints in our preferred CF specification.
The last point highlights the difference in meaning and interpretation of the coefficients
in the two approaches again. While the CF method estimates the average effect on all
the treated individuals, standard 2SLS only measures the impact on the subpopulation
of individuals who only took part because the respective LEO needed to spend their
remaining funds, independent of whether that makes any sense for them. Thus, we would
expect the LATE estimates to be smaller or even negative compared to the ATT ones.
In table 7, we check the robustness of these results by controlling in addition for
the local unemployment rate in the previous year. This accounts for possible local un-
employment dynamics which could influence both the current relative surplus and later
employment probabilities. Here, we see exactly the same pattern as in table 6, with the
only difference that the estimates of 2SLS and CF get both a bit more positive. Thus,
while the coefficient in the 2SLS model is still negative, it is now only at -3 ppoints in the
long run. Similarly, the coefficient of training increases slightly for CF3 to +12.4 ppoints.
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Summing up, we see that unemployed individuals modestly benefit from participating in
a public-sponsored training program (with about 1 out of 10 participants getting a job
because of the program), but this effect does not materialize if they are mainly selected
for budgetary reasons.
The results reported in tables 6 and 7 can also be used to discuss the empirical question
of whether participants in training programs are negatively or positively selected on un-
observable characteristics. That is, do caseworkers tend to send mostly lower motivated,
less organized and disciplined unemployed or is it the other way round? To answer this
question, we look at the differences between the OLS and the CF estimates, as the former
do not control for unobservable characteristics while the latter take their influence into
account.25 Concentrating on the long-run effects, we observe that the CF coefficients are
higher than those obtained from OLS. This means that participants tend to be negatively
selected with respect to variables which are typically unreported, but affect an individual’s
chances to find a job.
9 Heterogeneous effects across training programs
As described above, the programs considered in the analysis so far differ vastly in several
dimensions, most importantly with respect to duration and focus on acquiring new skills
or maintaining old ones. Therefore, estimating a simple average effect for all of them
together may hide a large degree of heterogeneity between them. In this section, we want
to see whether this is the case, i.e., we want to evaluate their individual impact separately.
The econometric challenge in this context is that we have only one variable, relative
surplus, to instrument four potentially endogenous participation decisions at the same
time. Therefore, we estimate the effect of participation in one type of training in a
certain month of unemployment against the alternative of not participating in training at
all in that month, thereby excluding those individuals who participate in other training
programs.
Thus, our approach differs from Heckman et al. (2008) who suggest IV estimation in
settings with multiple unordered treatments, where the estimation of pairwise effects of
one treatment versus another requires the availability of as many instruments as there
25We do not consider the 2SLS results in this respect, as we want to make a general point and not one
about the limited subset of compliers with our instrument.
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are treatments.26 As we do not focus on evaluating pairwise effects of different training
programs, we abstain from estimating an employment equation which models the effect
of all training programs simultaneously, i.e., includes multiple endogenous treatment vari-
ables in one outcome equation. We have only one instrument which potentially affects
participation in all training programs and therefore the respective non-treatment group
may change its selection in response to changes of the instrument. Therefore, we focus on
the binary comparison of participation in one type of training versus nonparticipation in
any training program.
This approach is useful for two reasons. On the one hand, we estimate the first-stage
selection model in the CF approach for each training program separately based on those
participating in the respective program and those not receiving any treatment. This
accounts for the selection of the treated relative to the control group regarding the non-
treatment outcome, which is what we need for the estimation of the ATT. On the other
hand, the treatment probability for all training programs in a certain month is very small
(recall that the treated are overrepresented in our evaluation sample), which means that
the composition of the non-treatment group is hardly affected by the effect of our budget
instrument on the participation in the alternative training programs. Thus, the key issue
for the estimation of the ATT is to control the selection bias among the treated, which
is what our approach focuses upon. Note that our instrument would change the selection
of both the treated and the controls if we wanted to estimate the pairwise effect between
two different programs. Thus, in light of Heckman et al. (2008), it would be difficult to
justify and we consequently refrain from doing so.
Table 8 reports the normalized individual first stage results obtained from a linear
probability model. The corresponding average partial effects from a probit are not in-
cluded, but are very similar and can be obtained upon request. We find that an increase
of one standard deviation in relative surplus raises the probability to take part in any of
the four programs significantly, with a range between 1.1 ppoints for retraining and 2.7
ppoints for practice firms. Relative to the average participation probability in the evalua-
tion sample, this corresponds to an increase of between 17.4% for practice firms and 3.4%
26Based on a choice-theoretic analysis of local IV estimation, Heckman et al. (2008) show that to
estimate the causal effect of one treatment versus another treatment in general requires a covariate
(instrument) for each treatment that changes the value of one treatment in the discrete choice model but
does not affect both the value of the other treatments and the outcome variable (in our case employment).
For the comparison of a treatment to the next best alternative, the necessary assumption is a bit weaker.
In this case, only one instrument for the specific treatment investigated is required that satisfies this
identification assumption.
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for SPST. This shows that local officials not only reacted strongly with respect to sending
unemployed individuals into any program, they also targeted specific programs stronger
than others. In line with our budget logic, there is a stronger increase in the probability
to enter one of the shorter and cheaper measures than for the longer and more expensive
ones. This suggests that the management of a LEO aimed at reducing the current relative
surplus, but at the same time did not want to bind their hands too much by committing
a large share of next year’s budget already in advance.
Table 9 displays the second stage estimates for the impact of getting training in one
of these programs on later employment status, again separately for year 1, years 2 to 3,
and years 4 to 10 after treatment start. Column 1 presents the raw descriptive differences
in working between treatment and control group. Starting with the short and medium
run, the differences are negative and statistically significant for all four program types
STT, PF, SPST, and RT during year 1 and for years 2 to 3 after program start, albeit the
association is negligible for SPST during years 2 and 3. The OLS coefficients in column 2,
based on the benchmark specification from before which controls for all personal, regional
and time variables, are very similar to the descriptive differences. This suggests that the
selection with respect to observable characteristics is negligible during the first three years
after program start. In other words, caseworkers do not seem to have chosen participants
in a way that their observable characteristics are associated systematically with higher or
lower employment perspectives.
The LATE coefficients for PF, SPST, and RT imply significantly negative treatment
effects, which are stronger than those obtained with OLS. Only for STT, however, they
are less negative than the OLS ones and insignificant.27 These results suggest that the
compliers of our budget instrument for PF, SPST, and RT are positively selected on
unobservable characteristics with regard to short- and medium-run employment outcomes.
Put differently, the lock-in effect is particularly strong for this type of participants. In
contrast, the lock-in effect for the compliers for STT is weaker than indicated by the OLS
estimates, suggesting a negative selection of unemployed into this program.
Turning to the control function (CF) results provides some further interesting find-
ings.28 For the longer programs SPST and RT, the CF estimates for year 1 are significantly
27Using the same specification as in Table 9, the ATT estimates based on a fractional probit (not
reported here) basically coincide with the OLS coefficients. Typically the first two to three digits are the
same. We take this as evidence that our specification is sufficiently flexible.
28We only report the results for the CF estimates based on specification 3, denoted CF3 above. Wald
tests for the significance of the selection correction terms imply that the most flexible specification is to
be preferred. In most cases, however, the CF change only little between the three specifications. One
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negative but much lower in absolute value than the OLS and the LATE effects. For years
2 to 3, the CF effects for SPST and RT are negative but close to zero and not significant.
Thus, the positive selection of the compliers does not carry over to the always takers.
To the contrary, the treated for SPST and RT are on average even negatively selected
with respect to unobservables and the lock-in effect is basically restricted to year 1. The
shorter programs STT and PF, on the other hand, show significantly negative and siz-
able CF estimates, suggesting a strong negative lock-in effect, which is more pronounced
for STT than the associated LATE effect. For PF, the CF coefficients imply a positive
selection of the treated with respect to unobservable characteristics, while the selection
seems to be negligible compared to all unemployed for STT. This shows that the treated
on average do not follow the negative selection of the group of compliers.
We now turn to the long-run effects in years 4 to 10 reported in Table 9. The descriptive
differences still show that participants in STT and PF are on average less likely to work in
the long run than nonparticipants (by 5.7 and 3.7 ppoints, respectively), while individuals
who took part in SPST and RT seem to be more successful by 2.6 and 7.6 ppoints. This
pattern of less effective or even harmful effects for the shorter programs, and small, but
beneficial results for the longer ones remains present for the OLS estimates. Again the
differences are minor, suggesting only negligible selection effects with respect to observable
characteristics. Turning to the LATE estimates in column 3, we again find worse effects
compared to OLS. While the decline is sizeable for PF, SPST, and RT (with 13, 9, and 6
ppoints, respectively), it is negligible for STT. The LATE itself is only significant for PF,
for which it amounts to -14 ppoints. As ATT for all participants, the CF estimates in
column 4 suggest better results than OLS in all cases except PF. The results are positive,
but insignificant for STT and SPST, whereas RT significantly increases later employment
and PF decreases it (by 14 and -21.5 ppoints, respectively). The CF effect for PF is even
larger in absolute value than the LATE. Contrasting columns 1 and 4 suggests that with
respect to long-run outcomes participants are a negative selection for STT and RT and a
positive selection for PF. Selection is negligible for SPST. These results also show that in
some cases selection patterns are not invariant over time.
For most cases, our findings imply that the LATE estimates are considerably worse
than those obtained from the CF and OLS. Together, this indicates that the individual
notable exception relates to the CF estimate for Long SPST in years 4 to 10, where the CF effect estimate
is larger and significant for the less flexible specifications CF1 and CF2. Due to space constraints, these
results are omitted here, but can be obtained from the authors.
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treatment effect deteriorates when more people are assigned to the program, because the
selection regarding observable and unobservable characteristics changes when the program
is expanded. This effect is particularly strong for SPST and RT. Thus, we conclude
that putting unemployed into training programs as a result of an end-of-year spending
effect is not only inefficient, but in most cases even harmful for the involved additional
participants, i.e., the compliers of our instrument. More generally, our results demonstrate
again that the results of empirical evaluations are sensitive to the choice of the analyzed
population. In particular, looking only at the compliers of a certain instrument may lead
to different conclusions than taking all participants into account. Also, the effectiveness
of the different training programs seems to vary strongly. Specifically, longer programs
focusing on the acquisition of new and specific skills fare comparatively better than shorter
programs with an emphasis on exercising and practicing more general skills. Above all,
the findings of negative long-run effects of practice firms suggest that their existence and
format should be closely examined and reconsidered in order to achieve better results for
the unemployed with the allocated funds.
As a further test of our conclusions so far, we take a closer look at the different group of
measures we have summed up under the label SPST until now. As noted above, these are
actually a rather heterogeneous mix of different training courses with varying content and
duration, starting from a couple of weeks up to two years. If the story is really short versus
long programs, we should also see differences if we distinguish the SPST courses by their
duration. Thus, we split them into short and long programs according to whether their
planed duration was at least or less than six months, and provide separate estimates. The
bottom parts of table 9 present the results of this exercise for each period after program
start. We find exactly the pattern as expected from the above considerations. That is, we
observe a much smaller lock-in effect during year 1 and a significant negative CF estimate
of -9 ppoints in years 4 to 10 for short SPST. In contrast, long SPST measures show a
strong and significant negative lock-in effect during year 1, and a positive, but insignificant
effect of 7 ppoints in the long run. Thus, even though the CF estimates for long SPST
regarding years 4 to 10 are not significant at conventional significance levels, the evidence
suggests a pattern of effects over time which is quite similar to the results found for RT.
In contrast, there is no evidence suggesting that short SPST is effective.
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10 Conclusions
This paper studies the employment effects of training programs for the unemployed up
to 10 years after program start. In order to come closer to estimating the causal effect,
we take advantage of strict budget rules in the 1980s and early 90s to implement an IV
strategy to account for a possible selection on unobservable characteristics of the partic-
ipants. In particular, we instrument program participation by how much the respective
local employment office spent during the first semester of a year relative to its own budget
and the other offices. Since a direct transfer of funds from one instrument of active labor
market policy to another or into the next year was not allowed, employment offices sitting
on comparatively large resources after the summer holidays faced incentives to increase
their spending in the months following the summer holidays. We show that such a po-
tential for end-of-year spending led to an increase in the probability of an unemployed
individual to enter a training program in the final months of the year which is not related
to her observed or unobserved characteristics.
Our empirical analysis of the employment effects of training leads to the following
main findings: First, at a methodological level, we show that a flexible control function
approach leads to more precise estimates of the program impact compared to standard
2SLS. Second, our estimates for the long-run employment effects of training differ both by
the target population we consider (compliers of our instrument vs. average participants)
and by the type of program. On the one hand, we see that unemployed who are only se-
lected for a training measure to get rid of budget surpluses do not profit from the program,
while the average participant gets a moderate boost in her employment prospects. On the
other hand, programs focusing on the acquisition of new specific skills and degrees (re-
training) increase the employment of participants in the long run, while shorter programs
concentrating on practicing the existing stock of skills (practice firms) even persistently
reduce employment prospects. Third, selection based on unobservable characteristics like
motivation, ambition, unobserved ability, or strive seems to be strong, but not uniformly
positive or negative. While we see evidence for a positive selection of participants in
practice firms and short SPST programs, participants in short-term training, long SPST,
and retraining seem negatively selected. This suggests that on average these measures are
targeted towards individuals with fairly low employment chances. However, the compliers
of our budget instrument appear strongly positively selected.
These findings are useful for the policy debate on the effectiveness of training pro-
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grams for the unemployed. We find strong evidence for heterogeneity of the employment
effects of training. Thus, it is important to analyze the effectiveness of different types of
training programs separately. Furthermore, unexpected funding to be spent on training
shows particularly bad employment effects. This suggests that caseworkers usually assign
individuals with higher potential returns to training first, while additional and unexpected
funding leads to a less efficient training assignment. Therefore, local employment offices
should have more leeway in their spending instead of having the incentive to exhaust
budgets which are exclusively earmarked for training.
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: Organizational structure of the Federal Employment Office (1980s)
Note: Lines in bold black mark the borders of the nine regional employment offices, those
in light grey the limits of the 142 local employment offices. The location of the federal
headquarter in Nuremberg is indicated by the corresponding LEO appearing in solid grey.
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Figure 2: The employment office’s budget year
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Figure 3: Monthly shares of total year entries into training programs, 1983 – 1993
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Note: Shares are calculated on the basis of entry numbers averaged over region and time.
The computation is based upon the 50% sample of all participants.
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Figure 4: Distribution of relative surplus
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Note: Relative surplus is defined as the difference between a local employment office’s budget
leeway after the first half of the year and the average budget leeway of all other districts in
that year. Budget leeway is calculated as the difference between planned budget for the entire
year and actual entries over the first six months of the year, normalized by the number of
eligible unemployed individuals (in 1,000) in July. The calculations use population weights.
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Table 1: Size of treatment and control group
Elapsed duration Control Treatment STTa) PF SPST RT
group group
1–3 771,139 36,782 3,813 3,070 19,446 10,453
4–6 426,544 24,261 3,186 2,327 13,017 5,731
7–9 320,852 19,214 2,698 2,040 9,535 4,941
10–12 240,373 14,679 2,358 1,670 7,057 3,594
1–12 1,758,908 94,936 12,055 9,070 49,055 24,719
Note: a) Since STT programs existed only until the end of 1992, the control group for this
training is a bit smaller and amounts to 1,470,480 nontreated observations. Absolute numbers
based upon 50% sample of all treated and 3% sample of all nontreated.
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Table 3: The effect of relative surplus on the probability to enter any program (1st stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Predictions on planned spending (last three years)
Average partial effect 2.577∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗ 1.922∗∗∗ 1.883∗∗∗ 1.866∗∗∗
Standard error (0.178) (0.231) (0.218) (0.223) (0.227)
F-statistic 209.671 90.083 78.097 71.186 67.684
Predictions on planned spending (last two years)
Average partial effect 2.613∗∗∗ 2.118∗∗∗ 1.846∗∗∗ 1.817∗∗∗ 1.806∗∗∗
Standard error (0.176) (0.221) (0.203) (0.210) (0.213)
F-statistic 220.621 91.949 82.589 75.097 71.745
Predictions on planned spending (last four years)
Average partial effect 2.308∗∗∗ 1.968∗∗∗ 1.696∗∗∗ 1.649∗∗∗ 1.617∗∗∗
Standard error (0.184) (0.251) (0.235) (0.242) (0.246)
F-statistic 157.886 61.610 52.009 46.384 43.064
Region & time infoa) yes yes yes yes yes
Personal characteristicsb) yes yes yes yes yes
Relative surplus in τ − 1 no yes yes yes yes
Region × year interactions no no yes yes yes
Local UR (Jan-July)c) no no no yes yes
Local UR (last year)d) no no no no yes
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The numbers report the effect of an increase in relative surplus by one standard deviation
in ppoints on the probability to enter any program for separate OLS regressions. Clustered
standard errors at local labor market level and time are reported in parentheses, the cor-
responding F-statistics in square brackets. a)Region and year fixed effects, calendar month
dummies, share of summer holidays in year and region, and interactions between share of
summer holidays, calendar month, and year. b)Individual characteristics, information on
previous employment, former treatment participation, and elapsed unemployment duration.
c)Local unemployment rate (LUR) in each month from January to July in the respective
year of program start. d)LUR in each month of the year τ − 1 (τ is the year of treatment
start). Calculations based upon our full sample of all treated and a 20% random sample
of the available nontreated. When used in the comparison group, individuals treated in the
future are weighted down relative to nontreated individuals.
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Table 4: Effect of training on subsequent employment of compliers (LATE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Desc OLS OLS Reduced Reduced LATE LATE
Form Form
1 -0.192∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.171∗∗ -0.138∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.078) (0.080)
2–3 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002 -0.132 -0.103
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.104) (0.106)
4–10 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.083 -0.03
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.096) (0.098)
Controls no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local UR no no yes no yes no yes
(last year)
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at time and local labor market level and obtained through weighted
bootstrapping based on 200 replications. Controls include region and time information, personal charac-
teristics, first lag of relative surplus, interaction terms between region and year, time path (January-July)
of local unemployment rate in the year of treatment start. Local UR (last year) represents the local
unemployment rate in each month of the previous year. Sample as in Table 3.
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Table 5: Specification tests for including the generalized residuals
Year 1 2–3 4–10
CF 1
ω0 0.039 (0.091) -0.030 (0.090) -0.251 (0.077)
∗∗∗
ω1 0.143 (0.040)
∗∗∗ -0.009 (0.034) 0.021 (0.031)
H0 : ω0 = ω1 = 0 20.794 [0.000] 0.226 [0.893] 23.368 [0.000]
CF 2
ω0 0.030 (0.088) -0.066 (0.091) -0.239 (0.077)
∗∗∗
ω1 0.011 (0.058) 0.107 (0.041)
∗∗∗ 0.132 (0.041)∗∗∗
H0 : ω0 = ω1 = 0 0.118 [0.943] 12.256 [0.002] 30.996 [0.000]
CF 3
ω0 0.274 (0.152)
∗ 0.051 (0.175) 0.049 (0.163)
ω1 -0.040 (0.056) 0.099 (0.040)
∗∗ 0.148 (0.040)∗∗∗
H0 : ω0 = ω1 = 0 5.548 [0.062] 6.220 [0.045] 13.948 [0.001]
H0 : ψ = 0 660.442 [0.000] 365.454 [0.000] 336.001 [0.000]
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively. Standard errors (in parentheses), test statistics (χ2-statistic from a Wald test
of joint significance of parameters), and p-values (in brackets) are clustered at time
and local labor market level and obtained through weighted bootstrapping based on
200 replications. Benchmark specification controls for regional and time variation,
individual characteristics, lagged value of relative surplus, time path (January-July)
of local unemployment rate in the year of treatment start, and local unemployment
rate from the previous year. CF 1 includes generalized residuals and interaction be-
tween generalized residuals and treatment dummy. CF 2 includes in addition to CF
1 interaction terms between individual characteristics and treatment dummy. CF
3 includes in addition to CF 2 interaction terms between generalized residuals and
individual characteristics. Sample as in Table 3.
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Table 6: ATT of Training on Subsequent Employment - Specification 4
Year OLS FP LATE CF 1 CF 2 CF 3
1 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.078) (0.057) (0.056) (0.051)
2–3 -0.055∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.132 -0.049 -0.027 -0.028
(0.002) (0.002) (0.104) (0.057) (0.059) (0.056)
4–10 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.083 0.156∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.096) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045)
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at time and local labor market
level and obtained through weighted bootstrapping based on 200 replications. Speci-
fication (4) controls for regional and time variation, individual characteristics, lagged
value of relative surplus, and time path (January-July) of local unemployment rate
in the year of treatment start. Sample as in Table 3.
Table 7: ATT of Training on Subsequent Employment - Specification 5
Year OLS FP LATE CF 1 CF 2 CF 3
1 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.138∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.080) (0.058) (0.057) (0.051)
2–3 -0.055∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.103 -0.037 -0.014 -0.016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.106) (0.058) (0.059) (0.056)
4–10 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.030 0.180∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.098) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045)
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at time and local labor market
level and obtained through weighted bootstrapping based on 200 replications. Speci-
fication (5) controls for regional and time variation, individual characteristics, lagged
value of relative surplus, time path (January-July) of local unemployment rate in the
year of treatment start, and local unemployment rate from the previous year. Sample
as in Table 3.
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Table 8: The effect of relative surplus on treatment probability in different training pro-
grams (OLS results)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
STT PF SPST RT SSPST LSPST
Average partial effect 2.527∗∗∗ 2.715∗∗∗ 1.695∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗
Standard error (0.665) (0.419) (0.330) (0.359) (0.391) (0.398)
F-statistic 14.415 41.975 26.346 9.738 13.920 16.716
Monthly hazard rate (in %) 22.32 15.59 49.86 33.39 37.16 28.74
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers report
the effect of an increase of one standard deviation in relative surplus on the probability to enter the respective
training program in ppoints. STT: Short-term training; PF: Practice firms; SPST: Specific professional skills and
techniques; RT: Retraining; SSPST: Short SPST (planned duration <= 6 months); LSPST: Long SPST (planned
duration > 6 months). Clustered standard errors at local labor market level and time are reported in parentheses,
the corresponding F-statistics in square brackets. Benchmark specification: controls for regional and time variation,
individual characteristics, lagged value of relative surplus, time path (January-July) of local unemployment rate
in the year of treatment start, and local unemployment rate from the previous year. Specification corresponds to
specification in column 5 of Table 3. Samples as in Table 3, excluding participants in other training programs.
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Table 9: Employment effects of training (by type of program)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Training program Des OLS LATE CF
Year 1
Short-term training (STT) -0.168∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.052 -0.147∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.058) (0.057)
Practice firms (PF) -0.165∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.063) (0.058)
Specific prof. skills -0.146∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.185∗ -0.107∗∗
and techniques (SPST) (0.002) (0.002) (0.101) (0.048)
Retraining (RT) -0.308∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.058) (0.050)
Short SPST -0.092∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.033
(0.003) (0.003) (0.126) (0.051)
Long SPST -0.225∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.101) (0.049)
Years 2-3
Short-term training (STT) -0.120∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.119∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.058) (0.064)
Practice firms (PF) -0.074∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.130∗ -0.098∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.075) (0.054)
Specific prof. skills -0.006∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.234∗ -0.008
and techniques (SPST) (0.003) (0.003) (0.141) (0.056)
Retraining (RT) -0.136∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.032
(0.003) (0.003) (0.058) (0.061)
Short SPST 0.014∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.164 -0.066
(0.003) (0.003) (0.160) (0.059)
Long SPST -0.006 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗ -0.019
(0.004) (0.003) (0.141) (0.052)
<continued on next page>
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Table 9 – <continued from previous page>
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Des OLS LATE CF
Years 4-10
Short-term training (STT) -0.057∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.063 0.017
(0.005) (0.004) (0.048) (0.067)
Practice firms (PF) -0.037∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.073) (0.047)
Specific prof. skills 0.026∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ -0.076 0.025
and techniques (SPST) (0.003) (0.002) (0.117) (0.043)
Retraining (RT) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.017 0.140∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.048) (0.066)
Short SPST 0.023∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.101 -0.094∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.144) (0.055)
Long SPST 0.030∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ -0.154 0.069
(0.004) (0.003) (0.117) (0.048)
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respec-
tively. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at time and local labor market level
and obtained through weighted bootstrapping based on 200 replications. Benchmark
specification: controls for regional and time variation, individual characteristics, lagged
value of relative surplus, time path (January-July) of local unemployment rate in the
year of treatment start, and local unemployment rate from the previous year. Specifi-
cation corresponds to specification CF 3 in Table 7. Samples as in Table 3, excluding
participants in other training programs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Details on the Construction of the Data Set
All samples used in this study were drawn according to the so called “birthday concept”.
That is, in the samples both from the FuU data and from the IEB data, 50% of all
possible birthdays starting with January, 2nd, are drawn and all observations with those
182 birthdays included. The 3% IEB sample was obtained in the same way, just that
here only 12 of the 182 birthdays chosen above are considered and all records that have
already been drawn before are dropped.
The combined raw data had a spell form and contained a lot of temporal overlaps. We
carried out a number of corrections, mostly based on Bender et al. (2005), in order to
improve data quality and prepare the data for the empirical analysis. The most important
data preparation steps involved extending the FuU data with information from IEB. The
merge procedure was based on a personal identification number and additional criteria
like consistency in time structure and contents of the corresponding spells. For all data
sources, we adjusted the temporal overlaps between the different types of spells, corrected
the education variable according to imputation rules developed by Fitzenberger et al.
(2006), and generated the data on a monthly basis.
The calculation of average outcomes based on the raw data for aggregates at the local
level, e.g. the local unemployment rate, uses all treated and controls applying the sampling
weights 12 versus 182. Because the 3% control sample is still very large regarding the
absolute number of individuals compared to the treatment sample, the relative weight of
a treated individual is five times the weight of an individual in the control sample for
the estimation of treatment effects (and for the descriptive differences between treated
and controls), see also footnote 19. For the empirical analysis using risk set matching, we
weight the observations depending on the data source and on the treatment status based
on elapsed unemployment duration. Individuals who are treated later on receive a lower
weight to compensate for the oversampling of the treated when they serve as controls
before they are treated. Thus, controls who never participate in a training program (i.e.,
those from the 3% IEB sample) receive a weight of 5 ∗ 182/12 relative to those controls
who later participate in training.
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A.2 Control Function Approach to Estimate ATT
To estimate a random coefficients model with both a binary endogenous treatment and a
fractional outcome variable, we adopt a flexible CF approach for nonlinear models with
discrete explanatory endogenous variables as described in Wooldridge (2014, section 6).29
The idea is that a control function derived from a variable addition test for endogeneity can
be used in a flexible way in a one-step or two-step quasi-maximum likelihood framework to
identify and estimate treatment effects based on the estimation of the average structural
function as introduced by Blundell and Powell (2003).30 Both for computational simplicity
and for the possibility to use a vector of flexible control functions, we opt for the two-
step control function approach to estimate the average structural function.31 Wooldridge
(2014) shows how the estimated average structural function can be used to estimate the
average treatment effect (ATE). We extend the approach to estimate the average effect
of treatment on the treated (ATT).
Following Wooldridge (2014), we maintain the following assumptions for identification:
(A1) E
[
yt | z, d, bdt , ut
]
= E
{
1
[
at0 + z1b0 + (bt0 + z1(b1 − b0))d+ bdtd+ ut ≥ 0
] | z, d, bdt , ut},
(A2) E
[
yt | d, z1, bdt , ut, e2
]
= E
[
yt | d, z1, bdt , ut
]
, and
(A3) D(bdt , ut | z, d) = D(bdt , ut | e2) .
The outcome variable of interest, yt =
∑
j∈Mt yj/mt [with yj is the employment dummy
in month j, Mt represents the different months j in time period t, and mt the length of
period t in months] is the fractional employment rate in period t since treatment start (the
average of monthly employment dummies). Following the potential outcome framework
(Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974), we assume that for each individual there are two potential
outcomes, {y1t , y0t } at time t associated with a time invariant binary treatment indicator
d determined at the time of treatment start, which is elapsed month of unemployment el
29The approach builds on Wooldridge (2005) and Terza et al. (2008) as well as on earlier work by
Heckman (1978), Lee (1982), Rivers and Vuong (1988), and Blundell and Powell (2003).
30Similarly, Terza et al. (2008) suggest a computationally simple“two-stage residual inclusion”approach
in a parametric nonlinear regression framework where the residuals from a first stage regression for an
endogenous treatment dummy can be used as a control function. Terza (2009) suggests a computationally
more expensive estimation approach which relies on correctly integrating out the control function, i.e. the
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term given the endogenous treatment dummy, in a nonlinear
regression specification.
31Wooldridge (2014, p. 233) points out that the two-step control function approach involves a different
parametric approximation compared to one-step bivariate probit estimation, which tightly specifies the
joint distribution of the error terms. Similarly, Terza’s (2008) two-stage residual inclusion approach
involves yet another parametric approximation.
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in risk set matching. d = 1 indicates participation in training and d = 0 nonparticipation.
We assume further that the observed outcome variable is expressed in terms of potential
outcomes as yt = y
0
t + (y
1
t − y0t )d. We impose the following latent index structure for yt
and d:
E(yt|d, z1) = Pr
[
y∗t,j ≥ 0
]
= Pr
[
at0 + z1b0 + (bt0 + z1(b1 − b0))d+ bdtd+ ut ≥ 0
]
(5a)
d = 1 [d∗ ≥ 0] = 1 [γ0 + z1γ1 + z2γ2 + ν ≥ 0] = 1 [zγ + ν ≥ 0] ,(5b)
y∗t,j and d
∗ (both defined implicitely) are latent indices, z1 involves the observed exoge-
nous covariates, z2 is the set of excluded instruments, z ≡ (z1, z2), and bdt , ut and ν are
unobserved random variables. 1 [A] denotes the indicator function with a value of one if
A is true and of zero otherwise. We allow for separate time effects (at0, bt0) and for sep-
arate effects (b0, b1) of the covariates z1 by treatment status. We assume a probit model
for the treatment dummy, i.e. ν | z ∼ N (0, 1). The potential outcome representation
in equation (5a) accounts for selection into treatment based on observable characteristics
(z1, z2), unobservables ut, and unobservable random gains from treatment b
d
t . We assume
E(bdt | z) = 0. Selection on unobservables is reflected in the statistical dependency be-
tween ν and (bdt , ut) (Wooldridge (2014), section 6.1; Blundell et al. (2005), section 3.4.1).
Furthermore, we assume that bdt and ut each follow a univariate normal distribution and
that (bdt , ut, ν) follow a joint continuous distribution conditional on z. The conditional
distribution of (bdt , ut) given ν is allowed to depend upon z1.
The variables z1 involve information on (i) individual characteristics like gender, age,
education, family status, nationality; (ii) occupation- and job-related variables from pre-
vious employment like employment status, earnings, firm size, and industry structure; (iii)
individual work history and indicators of former participation; (iv) regional information
at the state level as well as time specific variables. The instrument z2 involves the budget
surplus variable.
Assumption (A1) specifies the structural expectation as a fractional probit response
function with scaled coefficients (Wooldridge, 2005, 2014). Without further assumptions,
treatment effects are not identified from the conditional expectation function, because the
outcome variable yt does not only depend upon observed characteristics but also on the
unobserved heterogeneity effects, (bdt , ut), which we allow to depend upon the treatment
variable via ν.
Assumption (A2) is an ignorability condition on the control functions e2 in the struc-
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tural conditional expectation and essentially holds by the definition of e2. It means
that once observed and unobserved factors are controlled for in the response function,
proxies for observed and unobserved heterogeneity are redundant for yt. Under the
assumption that selection into treatment can be described by a probit model, a nat-
ural choice for the control function is using the generalized residual gr of the probit
model (gr involves the standard Heckman (1978, 1979) selection correction term gr =
dλ(zγ)− (1− d)λ(−zγ), where λ(.) denotes the inverse Mills’ ratio and γ the first stage
probit coefficients. Wooldridge (2014) shows that under correct specification of the probit
model for d, a variable addition test for treatment exogeneity based on the generalized
residuals is asymptotically optimal. Note that we estimate the effect of treatment started
at some point of time on future outcomes in period t, thus gr is determined at treatment
start and does not change over time t. Nevertheless, the control function e2 may vary
over time because (bdt , ut) can change over time.
Assumption (A3) imposes ignorability restrictions on the conditional distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity, such that conditioning on e2 in the structural expectation is suf-
ficient to correct for selectivity bias arising from the endogeneity of treatment (Wooldridge,
2014).32 Since the endogenous regressor in our application is a dummy variable, we should
view the ignorability assumption about the conditional distribution of (bdt , ut) only as an
approximation for a given vector of control functions. Note that the impact of the selec-
tion correction term is not nonparametrically identified because the sign of the generalized
residual gr is perfectly collinear with the treatment dummy (see Wooldridge, 2014, section
6.3). This is in contrast to the case of a continuous endogenous regressor as discussed in
Blundell and Powell (2003). To increase the flexibility and the robustness of the analy-
sis, Wooldridge (2014) suggests adding the square of gr, interactions between gr and the
treatment dummy and between gr and the observed characteristics z1 to the vector of
control functions.33
Under assumptions (A1)-(A3) and by the law of iterated expectations, the average
structural function at time t among the treated d = 1 can be expressed as
(6) ASF (d˜, z1, d = 1) =
32Note that a standard exogeneity assumption as used for IV estimation of linear regressions such that
the implied error term in equation (A1) is independent of the exogenous covariates can not hold because
yt is a discrete outcome variable, see Wooldridge (2014, p. 232).
33An alternative extension builds on the assumption that (ut, ν) are jointly normally distributed. In this
case, the vector of proposed control functions consists of three components: gr, gr2, and the interaction
between gr and linear predictions from the first stage probit estimation (Kimhi, 1999).
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Prbdt ,ut
(
at0 + z1b0 + (bt0 + z1(b1 − b0))d˜+ bdt d˜+ ut ≥ 0 | d = 1, z1
)
.
where Prξ (·) indicates a probability based on the distribution of ξ. Blundell and Powell
(2003, 2004) and Wooldridge (2014) define the ASF for the entire sample. Because of our
interest in the ATT, we restrict attention to the treated, and we define the ASF for the
two potential outcomes conditional on d = 1.
As suggested by Wooldridge (2014, section 6.4), we use the following flexible set of
control functions eˆ2(di, zi) = (ĝri, ĝridi, ĝrizi1), which enter as additional regressors in
our fractional probit for employment (see equation 6). As motivated by Lee (1982), the
interaction terms ĝrizi1 account for deviations from the joint normality assumptions as
imposed in Heckman (1978).34 The interaction term ĝridi accounts (as an approximation)
for the random coefficient of the treatment dummy in the structural employment equation
(5a), see e.g. Blundell et al. (2005, section 3.4.1) for the continuous outcome case.35
Under these assumptions, using the approach suggested in Wooldridge (2014, section
6.4), the average structural function for the treated can be expressed by integrating out
the control functions e2 as
(7) ASF (d˜, z1, d = 1) =
Ee2|d=1,z1
{
Pr
(
at0 + z1b0 + (bt0 + z1(b1 − b0))d˜+ bdt d˜+ ut > 0 | d = 1, z1, e2
)}
,
where Eξ [·] indicates the expectation with respect to the distribution of ξ. Our estimation
approach is based on the following insight: Equation (7) makes explicit that once the
observed conditional expectation of yt given (z, d, e2) is estimated consistently, which in
turn is implied by having sufficient variation in the instrumental variables z2, identification
of the average effect of treatment on the treated is feasible by integrating out the joint
distribution of (z, e2) among the treated.
For estimation purposes, we add estimated versions of the control functions e2 to a
second stage probit regression of employment, where we regress yt on d, z1, interactions
34Lee (1982) also suggested to add the squared generalized residuals ĝr2i as further control variable
to allow for a more flexible estimation approach. Doing so, we obtained rather implausible and noisy
estimates. We do not report these results here because it turned the estimates are plagued by strong
multicollinearity. We opted for keeping the interaction terms instead of adding ĝr2i . Detailed results are
available upon request.
35Under joint normality of (ν, bdt , ut), the coefficient of gri in the control function differs by treated
status di because the linear projection of the joint error term b
d
t di + ut on ν differs by di. In the absence
of the random coefficient part, i.e. bt = 0, and under joint normality of (ν, ut), the generalized residual
ĝri has the same coefficient irrespective of the value di takes and thus ĝridi should have a zero coefficient.
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between d and z1, as well as interactions between d and components of eˆ2. The most
general specification estimated is
(8) Ê(yit | di, zi1, ei2) =
Φ
(
δˆ0t + δˆ1tdi + z1bˆ0 + z1δˆ1di + ωˆ0ĝri + ωˆ1ĝridi + zi1ĝriψˆ
)
,
where Ê(yit|.) is the estimated expected value, Φ(.) the standard normal distribution
function, δˆ0t, δˆ1t are time specific effects, and bˆ0, δˆ1, ωˆj, ψˆ further coefficient estimates.
Based on the estimated equation (8), we estimate the ATT at time t by integrating
out the distribution of zi1, eˆi2 among the treated di = 1 as
(9) τ̂ATT,t =
1
N1
∑
di=1
{
Φ
(
δˆ0t + δˆ1t + z1bˆ0 + z1δˆ1 + ωˆ0ĝri + ωˆ1ĝri + zi1ĝriψˆ
)
− Φ
(
δˆ0t + z1bˆ0 + ωˆ0ĝri + zi1ĝriψˆ
)}
.
Note that the same control function terms for treated individuals apply to the potential
treatment and nontreatment state except for the coefficient ωˆ1 being ’switched off’ in the
nontreatment state (second term). This is because the ωˆ1-component of the individual
selection effect does not have an impact in the nontreatment state (see Blundell et al.
(2005), section 3.4.1).
Our empirical analysis pools the estimation of the time average of the outcome equation
(5a) for year 1, years 2 to 3, and years 4 to 10. This results in the estimation of three
separate fractional probit regressions. The dependent variables are the employment rates
during year 1, years 2 to 3, and years 4 to 10, respectively.
Inference when estimating the fractional probit with control functions and the ATT is
based on a clustered version of the weighted bootstrap (see Barbe and Bertail (1995)). The
weighted bootstrap is based on resampling random weights with expected value one. This
bootstrap approach eliminates potential estimation problems in the resamples, because in
each resample a weighted fractional probit is implemented with strictly positive weights
for all sample observations. The standard pairwise bootstrap may result in resamples
with perfect collinearity of regressors or perfect predictions caused by the use of dummy
variables. As suggested in Fitzenberger and Muehler (2015), we adapt the weighted
bootstrap to estimate standard errors which are clustered at the district and year level.
This is done by drawing the same weight within a cluster unit. Specifically, for the
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weighted bootstrap, we draw the weights from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,2].
Therefore, the weights have a mean of one and a variance of 1/3. As drawing from this
interval underestimates the variance by a factor of three, the obtained bootstrap variance-
covariance matrix has to be multiplied by three.
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A.3 List of variables
Variable Description
Instrument
Relative surplus Difference between planned entries for the entire year and actual entries
during the first six months per 1,000 eligible unemployed in July at the
level of the local employment office (LEO)
Individual characteristics
Female Equal to one if female
Age Age years dummies: 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44, 45–50
Education Education dummies: no vocational training degree, vocational training
degree, uni/college degree, education unknown
Nationality Equal to one if foreigner
Marital status Equal to one if married
Children Equal to one if at least one child in household
Previous employment, former treatment, elapsed unemployment duration
Months employed Dummies for being employed in month M (M=6, 12, 24) before current
unemployment
Firm size Dummies for < 10 employees, ≥ 10 and <20 employees, ≥ 20 and < 50
employees, ≥ 50 and < 200 employees, ≥ 200 and < 500 employees, ≥ 500
employees/missing
Employment status Dummies for apprentice, blue collar worker, white collar worker, worker
at home/missing, part-time worker
Industry Dummies for agriculture, basic materials, metal/vehicles/electronics, light
industry, construction, production oriented services/trade/banking,
consumer oriented, organizational and social services/missing
Occupation Dummies for farmer and fisher, manufacturing occupations, techni-
cians, service occupation, miners/others/missing
Wage Log of daily earnings
Former participant Dummies for participation in any active labor market training program
reported in our data in year(s) Y (Y=1,2) before current unemployment
Elapsed unemployment Dummies for 1–12 months of elapsed unemployment duration
Region and time information at program start
Region Regional employment office: dummies for Schleswig-Holstein and
Hamburg (SHH), Lower Saxony and Bremen (NB), North Rhine-
Westphalia (NW), Hesse (HE), Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland (RPS),
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (BW), North Bavaria (NBY), South Bavaria (SBY),
Berlin (BE)
Year Calendar year dummies for the time period from 1983-1993
Region × Year Interaction terms between region and year
Month Calendar month dummies for the months August-November
Summer vacation Share of summer holidays in year and region; interaction term between
summer vacation and August dummy; interaction term between summer
vacation and calendar year
Local labor market characteristics
Local unemployment rate Local unemployment rate (LUR) in each month from January to July in
the respective year of program start; LUR in last year before program start
Note: Variables in bold are the omitted category in the empirical analysis.
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